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THE FAILURE TO USE SEAT BELTS AS A BASIS FOR
ESTABLISHING CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE,
BARRING RECOVERY FOR PERSONAL INJURIES
In 1965, 49,000 Americans lost their lives in automobile accidents. 1,800,-
000 received disabling injuries, with a cost to the nation of $8,900,000,-
000.1 The National Safety Council states:
Seat belts are now available to more than half of all passenger occu-
pants ... However ... the percentage of all passenger car occupants
using belts ... is only about sixteen per cent.
Since full usage of seat belts would save at least 5,000 lives a year, the
current usage figure indicates that belts saved between 800 and 1,000
lives in 1965.
A ... study of fatal accidents which occurred over the Fourth of July
and Labor Day weekends in 1965 indicated that users of seat belts had
a fatality rate nearly three fourths lower than that of nonusers.2
The Congress, federal and state agencies are concerned with the impli-
cations of these statistics, and thirty-three state legislatures have enacted
statutes requiring installation of the belts in certain vehicles.' In view of
these factors, the question arises as to whether a person injured in an auto
accident caused by the negligence of another should be denied recovery
for injuries received as a result of his failure to use an available seat belt?
Of the state courts that have considered this question,' one has found
that a statute requiring seat belts installed "for the use of" certain parties,
under certain circumstances imposes a duty upon those parties to actually
use the belt. Failure to do so would be considered a breach of statutory
duty, and recovery would be barred.' Denial of recovery may also result
from a finding of contributory negligence based upon a violation of a com-
mon law duty to wear seat belts.
1 NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FAcTs (1966 ed.). A disabling injury is one which
prevents a person from performing any of his usual activities for a full day beyond the day
of the accident.
2 Id. at 53.
3 See Automobile Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 563, 85th Cong. (Sept. 9, 1966) ; 31 Fed. Reg.
7911 (1966) ; Note, 38 So. CAL. L. REV. 733 (1965) ; "A Follow-up Study of Seat Belt Usage",
Traffic Safety Magazine, Natn'l Safety Council (Dec. 1965). See appendix I for listing of
state statutes.
4 For a discussion of the several cases see 7 For The Defense No. 2 (Feb. 1966); 7 For
The Defense No. 6 (June 1966); 7 For The Defense No. 7 (Sept. 1966); Time Magazine,
July 22, 1966. See also Kavanaugh v. Butorac (Ind.App.Ct., Div.1) 35 U.S.L. WEEK 2336
(Dec. 1966), and Mortensen v. So. Pacific Co., 245 A.C.A. 248, 53 Cal.Rptr. 851 (1966).
5 Stockinger v. Dunisch (Cir.Ct. Sheboygan Cty., Wisc.) (1964) reported in 5 For The
Defense 79 (Dec. 1964).
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I
COMMON LAW CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
In order to establish contributory negligence the conduct of the plaintiff
must be found to have fallen below that standard to which he is required
to conform for his own protection. Further, the substandard conduct must
have contributed, as a legal cause, to the harm suffered by the plaintiff.'
California courts, despite criticism of the theory by several writers, utilize
the doctrine of contributory negligence, and if the defendant pleads and
proves the elements of the defense, plaintiff is completely barred from
any recovery. 7
To establish the defense, three elements must be shown: first, a stan-
dard of self-protective care; second, a failure to conform to that standard;
and third, a causal relation between the breach of the standard and the
resulting injury.'
A. Standard of Self-Protective Care
Suppose the plaintiff, in a hypothetical situation, has been injured in
an automobile accident and the defendant who caused the collision asserts
that plaintiff's failure to use an available seat belt was contributory negli-
gence which bars plaintiff from recovery. Within this factual context,
defendant must establish that plaintiff was under a duty to "buckle up"
for his own protection. Once the standard is established, the plaintiff must
have conformed to it in order to avoid the defense.' Thus the question
becomes whether under all the circumstances, a reasonable man would
take the self-protective measure of using a seat belt.' °
It has been held that the plaintiff's knowledge and experience must be
considered by the court in determining this standard of care." The well
known fact that seat belts prevent injuries and save lives' 2 might be a
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §463 (1965).
7 Quirk v. San Francisco, 105 Cal. App. 2d 85, 232 P.2d 893 (1951); Tucker v. United
Railroads, 171 Cal. 702,154 Pac. 835 (1916).
8 PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §64 (3rd ed. 1964).
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §463 (1965).
10 PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 64 (3rd ed. 1964). See also Brisbin v. Wise Co., 6 Cal. App.
2d 441, 44 P.2d 622 (1935).
1 1 Sullivan v. Lydick Roofing Co., 378 S.W.2d 419 (Tex.Civ.App. 1964,); Knight v.
Thomas, 141 So.2d 134 (La.Civ.App. 1961); Wertz v. Lincoln Liberty Life Ins. Co., 152
Neb. 451, 41 N.W.2d 740 (1950).
12 See 16 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 364 for a complete discussion of seat belts and their
effectiveness. See also, Note, 14 DE PAUL L. REV. 152 (1964); "A Follow-up Study of Seat
Belt Usage", Traffic Safety Magazine, Natn'l Safety Council (Dec. 1965); Medical Tribune,
Sept. 16, 1964 and Nov. 6, 1965; Huelke and Gikas "Determination of Seat Belt Effectiveness
for Survival in Fatal Highway Collisions", 7th Stapp Car Crash Conference (1965).
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factor which a reasonably prudent man should take into account before
acting. Witness, for instance, the ever-expanding and well publicized body
of scientific knowledge of seat belt effectiveness. 13
This approach seems to have been adopted in Mortensen v. Southern
Pacific Co., 4 where it was held that a defendant employer was negligent
in failing to install seat belts in a truck used by his employees. The Court
considered: 1) that accidents in California are numerous and likely to
happen (a fact in common knowledge); and 2) that seat belts are known
to prevent death and minimize injury. Although the case deals with fail-
ure to install rather than to use belts, it is a judicial recognition that com-
mon knowledge of seat belt effectiveness is an element in determining the
standard of care-self-protective or otherwise-to which a person is
required to adhere.
B. Breach of Duty
Having established a standard of self-protective care, the defendant
must show that plaintiff's conduct fell below that standard. In assessing
the conduct of the plaintiff in failing to buckle a seat belt, two factors
must be considered: does the interest pursued justify taking the risk, and
how easily is the risk obviated." It is clear that there is a great risk of
injury or death inherent in driving, and it can also be seen that these
risks are effectively diminished by merely buckling a seat belt.' But
what of the interest pursued by plaintiff? Can there be any facts or cir-
cumstances connected with his driving that might justify plaintiff's failure
to use the belts?
In Wertz v. Lincoln Liberty Life Ins. Co.,' an experienced window
washer failed to use his safety belt, slipped, and plunged to his death.
Wertz was found contributorily negligent for failing to use his safety belt,
and his estate was denied recovery from the negligent building owner.
It might be argued, in the light of Wertz, that one who failed to use seat
belts while driving should also be found contributorily negligent. The
beltless automobile driver faces great risk of injury or death, and need
13 In a recent nationwide poll of over 2 million motorists by the Auto Industries Highway
Safety Committee, it was found that 76% of those participating used seat belts on long trips.
Best's Weekly News Digest, Oct. 26, 1965. Billboards, posters, advertisements and public
service announcements on radio and television are constantly utilized by organizations such
as the National Safety Council to inform the motoring public of seat belts and their effec-
tiveness.
14 Mortensen v. Southern Pacific Co., 245 A.C.A. 248, 53 Cal..Rptr. 851 (1966).
15 PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 64 (3rd ed. 1964) ; Henshaw v. Belyea, 220 Cal. 458, 32 P.2d
348 (1934).
16 16 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 353; "Smart Drivers Use Seat Belts", Stock No. 329.96-18,
Natn'l. Safety Council; Huelke and Gikas, "Determination of Seat Belt Effectiveness for Sur-
vival in Fatal Highway Collisions", 7th Stapp Car Crash Conference (1965).
17 152 Neb. 451, 41 N.W.2d 740 (1950).
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exert only minimal effort to protect himself, as in the Wertz situation.
The interest pursued by Wertz, earning his livelihood washing windows,
did not justify his failure to use a safety belt. Thus, it would seem that
the interest pursued by the beltless driver, and the determination that
such interest did or did not justify the failure to use the belts, would be
a question of fact in each case for the jury. And shouldn't it follow that
the interest pursued would have to be more than a casual drive in order
to justify the exposure to the great risk of injury or death while driving
without available seat belts in use, especially when the ease by which pro-
tection can be attained is considered?
Completely barring the recovery of the forgetful or absent-minded
person who fails to buckle up only for that reason, may seem harsh. But
shouldn't forgetfulness constitute contributory negligence? California
courts indicate that the forgetfulness of the plaintiff will be considered
as a factor for the jury in determining, under all the circumstances,
whether or not the plaintiff was contributorily negligent.18
To determine whether or not plaintiff fell below the standard required
of a reasonably prudent man by his failure to use a seat belt, all the cir-
cumstances of his journey, including the urgency of the moment and the
forgetfulness or asbentmindedness of the plaintiff must be considered.
C. Proximate Cause
The third and most crucial element of the defendant's case is that of
proximate or legal cause. The defendant must show that although his
negligence may have been an element in the causal chain, plaintiff's neg-
ligent failure to use seat belts was also a legal cause of the injuries sus-
tained.
A plaintiff's contributory negligence is a legal cause of the injury if it
is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.'9 If failure to use seat
belts is considered such a contributing cause then theoretically plaintiff
should be barred from all recovery. However, there are other practical
considerations.
(1) WILLINGNESS OF THE COURT TO HEAR EVIDENCE OF THE ISSUE
OF PROXIMATE CAUSE
The first problem is whether the court will admit evidence regarding
plaintiff's failure to use seat belts when considering the issue of proximate
cause. In Sams v. Sams2 an automobile passenger brought an action
against his driver for personal injuries sustained by him when the defend-
18 Schance v. Adams (H.O.) Tile Co., 131 Cal.App.2d 549, 280 P.2d 851 (1955) McStay
v. Citizens Nat. Trust and Sav. Bank, 5 Cal. App. 2d 595, 43 P.2d 560 (1935).
1 9 Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & S.S.M.R. Co., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920).
20 Sams v. Sams, 148 S.E.2d 154 (N.C. 1966) ; see also Vernon v. Droeste (Dist. Ct. Brazos
Cty., Texas) (1966) reported in 7 For The Defense No. 7 (Sept. 1966).
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ant drove his car off the road. Plaintiff alleged gross negligence, and de-
fendant asserted the defense of contributory negligence, based on plain-
tiff's failure to use her seat belt. On appeal it was held that defendant
should be allowed to prove, if he could, that the failure of plaintiff to use
the seat belt furnished for her safety amounted to a failure to exercise
reasonable care, and that such failure was the proximate cause of the
injuries.
Indiana courts, however, are unwilling to let a jury hear that an injured
passenger failed to use his seat belt. In Kavanaugh v. Butorac,21 plain-
tiff lost an eye when upon impact he was thrown against the rear view
mirror of the negligent driver's vehicle. He had not fastened an available
seat belt, but the court refused to allow a showing either of the protection
given by seat belts or that plaintiff might not in fact have been thrown
forward by the impact had he worn his seat belt. In the words of the court:
First, we recognize the possibility that at some future date, the failure
to use seat belts may bring into play the doctrine of avoidable conse-
quences. But, at this time and in this case the doctrine cannot be ap-
plied. The expert testimony and the record as a whole is not sufficient
to show that the injury could have truly been avoided had the passenger
used his seat belt. Second, this court cannot, in this case, say as a matter
of law that the failure to use available seat belts is contributory negli-
gence. Third, neither can it be said that the failure constitutes an
assumption of the risk... And since the failure to use a seat belt does
not establish contributory negligence, assumption of risk, or avoidable
consequences, it follows that reversible error could not have resulted
from any ruling of the court on the evidence with respect to the subject
of seat belts.22
In Brown v. Kendrick,23 a Florida case, plaintiff sued the owner of
the automobile in which she was injured, and again the defendant asserted
the defense of contributory negligence based on plaintiff's failure to fasten
an available seat belt. The defense was stricken by the trial court, and
on appeal the court stated:
(T)he plaintiff's failure to fasten her seat belt was not such negligence
as to contribute to the occurrence of the accident, nor to be the proxi-
mate.., cause of the injury in the absence of a showing that the acci-
dent could have been avoided in the absence of such a negligent act.24
The Brown court seemed to leave open the question of defendant's proof
on the issue of whether the injuries could have been prevented by use of
seat belts. However, even that door was closed to defendant when the court
stated that to permit the defense would be judicial legislation:
21 Kavanaugh v. Butorac (Ind.App.Ct., Div. 1) 35 U.S.L. Week 2336 (Dec. 1966).
22 Id. at 2336.
23 Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So.2d 49 (Fla. 1966).
24MId. at 51.
April 1967] COMMENTS
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
(I) t is not within the province of this court to legislate on the subject
... We have read Sams v. Sams ... but do not feel that this court is
ready nor in a position to adopt a similar construction as the law of
Florida.2 5
Under the recent holding in Mortensen v. Southern Pacific Co.,26 it
would appear that the California courts might allow a defendant to prove
that had plaintiff used the available seat belt, the injuries would have been
avoided or at least mitigated. Admissible evidence would seem to include
plaintiff's habits of using seat belts and his knowledge (actual or pre-
sumed) of the attendant dangers in failing to use them. Also relevent
would be the life saving characteristics of properly fastened seat belts
which would probably involve expert opinion. 7 In the words of the
Mortensen court:
Testimony as to the number of automobile collisions in the area in
question (and common knowledge of the frequency of such collisions
on California highways) affords a basis for a finding that a collision
forcing a car off the roadway is reasonably foreseeable. Granted such
foreseeability, the nature of the other driver's act negates neither negli-
gence nor proximate cause ... Here, we deal with the general likelihood
of collisions ... not with the peculiar causation of the particular colli-
sion which gives relevance to the need for seat belt protection.2"
(2) IMPACT-INJURY DICHOTOMY
The second problem faced by defendant in establishing the proposi-
tion that plaintiff's failure to wear his seat belt is a proximate cause of
his injuries is the fact that such failure will probably never be a cause of
the impact with the other vehicle or object involved in an accident. The
defendant's own negligence causes the collision. The plaintiff, on the other
hand, may not be suing for the collision, but rather to recover for personal
injuries received. 9 The question thus becomes the practical one of deter-
mining which injuries could have been prevented by the use of seat belts,
even though the defendant's negligence may have caused the collision.
The impact-injury dichotomy, then, merely begs the question of who has
caused what injuries."
25 Id. at 51.
2 6 Mortensen v. Southern Pacific Co., 245 A.C.A. 248, 53 Cal.Rptr. 851 (1966). See also
Kapp v. Sullivan Chevrolet, 234 Ark. 395, 353 S.W.2d 5 (1962).
27 That this would be admissible, see Cal. Evid. Code § 801-802 and comments thereafter.
28 Mortensen v. Southern Pacific Co., supra note 26, 245 A.C.A. at pg. 252, 53 Cal. Rptr.
at p. 854 (1966). On this issue the trial court heard evidence from a physicist and patrolman
as to the effectiveness of seat belts in reducing fatalities and minimizing injuries.
29 Note, 38 So. Cal. L. Rev. 733 (1965).
30 The issue is essentially one of (a) proof on the issue of proximate cause of injuries
sustained, and (b) apportionment of damages discussed under "consequences" of the use
of the defense. For a holding that the impact/injury dichotomy is important, see Brown v.
Kendrick, 192 So.2d 49 (Fla. 1966).
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(3) CAUSATION OF THE PARTICULAR INJURY
The third and by far most basic problem is how to prove that a par-
ticular injury would have been prevented by the use of seat belts; or
alternatively that a particular injury was caused by the failure to use a
seat belt. Involved are questions concerning the validity of expert evi-
dence pertaining to causation of various types of injuries and related
matter which are beyond the scope of this comment. 1
In view of the statistics which demonstrate the effectiveness of seat
belt usage in preventing injury and death, and the ease with which this
protection can be attained, contributory negligence in this regard should
be recognized as a valid defense. The elements of contributory negligence
are clearly applicable.
II
STATUTORY DUTY TO WEAR SEAT BELTS
Prescinding for the moment from common law contributory negligence,
there remains the question of whether a court could find a legislative
purpose to impose an affirmative duty to wear seat belts. Thirty-three
states have statutes which require installation of seat belts,82 although they
do not explicitly require the drivers or passengers to use them. They do,
however, require them to be readily available for use, "so that plaintiff
may have an opportunity to protect himself from a foreseeable risk of
harm.)33
An interesting question of statutory interpretation was raised in the
case of Stockinger v. Dunisch 4 (trial court) where the defendant asserted
the defense of contributory negligence based on plaintiff's failure to utilize
an available seat belt. A Wisconsin statute required that seat belts be
installed "for use in left front and right front seats." 5 Speaking of this
statute, the court stated:
(I)t must be clear that the statute contemplates the use of such belts
when the car is equipped with them by the driver... and the passenger
... whenever such driver or passenger or both, have the duty to exer-
cise ordinary care for their own safety. 6
31 For an exhaustive treatment of the question of defendant's proof in cases involving
failure to use seat belts, see 16 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 351-479. See also Kapp v. Sullivan
Chevrolet, 234 Ark. 395, 353 S.W.2d 5 (1962) for a detailed description of dynamics of the
human body during collisions and the effect of seat belts thereon.
32 See Appendix I.
33 "Seat Belt Liability", Defense Memo, 7 For The Defense No. 2 (Feb. 1966).
34 (Cir.Ct. Sheboygan Cty., Wisc.) (1964) reported in 5 For The Defense 79 (Dec. 1964).
35 WISC. STAT. §347.48; see also Wisc. STAT. §331.045.
36 Stockinger v. Dunisch (Cir. Ct. Sheboygan Cty., Wisc.) (1964) reported in 5 For The
Defense 79 (Dec. 1964).
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It was left for the jury to decide when "ordinary care" in the exercise of
self-protection requires use of seat belts. The jury found that under the
circumstances a reasonable man would have worn the belts and under the
Wisconsin comparative negligence statute 7 reduced damages by 10%.
A comparative analysis of existing statutes38 shows that of thirty-
three "installation" statutes, eighteen require installation "for use." In
four states, it is provided that the statutes are not to be used as a standard
of care in a civil negligence action. For example, the Tennessee Code pro-
vides that "in no event shall failure to wear seat belts be considered as
contributory negligence." 31
The California Vehicle Code, section 27309, is similar to the Wiscon-
sin statute in reciting that seat belts be installed "for use".4" However, the
California statute omits the language of the Tennessee Code quoted above
to the effect that the statute does not establish a standard of care. There-
fore, it might be argued that the legislature intended to leave open to the
courts the question of whether the statute imposes an affirmative duty to
wear seat belts. The basic question then becomes one of how much sup-
port the court is willing to lend to the strong public policy favoring the
use of seat belts as a means of lessening the slaughter on our highways.
One approach to the problem is exemplified by the Stockinger case.
By liberally interpreting the statute, the court seems to indicate that a
lackadaisical attitude toward seat belt usage is precisely what the legis-
lature is seeking to overcome. By barring or reducing recovery in personal
injury suits, the court is implementing this policy. The question is not one
involving the usual statutory duty of protective care which, if violated, is
negligence per se.41 Rather, the inquiry is, in what circumstances does
the statute require the use of seat belts and in what circumstances does it
not.
An alternative approach is that the statute requiring installation of
seat belts is unrelated to a duty to use them, regardless of the words
"for use." In a Wisconsin trial court case,42 decided after Stockinger but
involving the same statute, the court instructed:
The law does not require operators of automobiles to use safety belts.However, in passing on the question as to whether or not the plaintiff
... was negligent for failing to use the seat belt you may take into
37 The more difficult question of what the result should be in a state where contributary
negligence is a complete bar is examined in the final section of this comment.
3s See Appendix I.
39 TENN. CODE ANN. §59-930. See Appendix I for other such statutes.
40 CAL. VER. CODE §27309.
41 Mechler v. McMahon, 184 Minn. 476, 239 N.W. 605 (1935); PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
§35 (3rd ed. 1964).
42 Busick v. Budner (Cir.Ct. Milwaukee Cty., Wisc.) (1965) reported in 7 For The
Defense No. 6 (June 1966).
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consideration the fact that the automobile was equipped with safety
belts and that a safety belt was available for use by her. 43
Thus, the defendant's escape route from this negative approach appears
to be that, although the court will not raise a statutory duty based on
legislative intent, it will consider the statute and the policy for which it
stands in arriving at a common law duty of self-protective care: " i.e.,
the legislature did not prescribe that the seat belts be used, but the fact
that it is mandatory that they be made available may be a factor in meas-
uring the conduct of plaintiff in not buckling up. Possibly this is the better
approach; while not stretching statutory interpretation too far, the court
is still furthering the public policy in favor of seat belt usage.
Together with these possible arguments based on California Vehicle
Code section 27309 and similar statutes, the defendant might also demon-
strate that other types of seat belt legislation indicate a growing concern
by the public that seat belts be used. Rhode Island requires that belts be
used by drivers in certain named vehicles.40 A number of United States
Government agencies require installation and use of seat belts in govern-
ment-owned vehicles,46 and California requires the use of seat belts in
driver training vehicles47 and in fire fighting vehicles. 8 Since, in the above
discussed situation the legislature explicitly favors the use of seat belts, it
could be argued that "installation" statutes such as section 27309 also
require installed belts to be used. On the other hand, if no statutory duty is
created, the legislation at least indicates a definitive public policy favoring
the recognition of a common law duty to wear seat belts.
III
FAILURE TO INSTALL SEAT BELTS AND RESULTANT LIABILITY
A supplier of automobiles who fails to comply with California Vehicle Code
section 27309 requiring installation of seat belts might be found negli-
gent per se.49 Section 27309, however, is only applicable to suppliers of
vehicles as regards failure to install seat belts, without regard to possible
liability for non-use thereof.
Is it negligence for an employer to fail to install seat belts in his
vehicle which is used by his employee? In the 1966 California case of
43 Id.
44 See Part I in this comment for a discussion of common law duty to wear seat belts for
self-protective care.
45 GEN. LAWS R.I. § 31-23-41 (Supp. 1965).
46 16 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 364.
47 CAL. VE11. CODE §27304.
48 CAL. VEH. CODE §27305.
49 Clinkscales v. Carver, 22 CaI.2d 72, 136 P.2d 777 (1943).
April 1967] COMMENTS
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
Mortensen v. Southern Pacific Co.5" an employee was thrown from his
employer's pick-up truck and killed after being rear-ended by an intoxi-
cated driver who later pleaded guilty to a charge of manslaughter. The
trial court directed a non-suit for the employer at the close of the employ-
ee's case, despite the fact that the evidence showed that the employee's
fractures resulted from his ejection from the vehicle which had sub-
sequently rolled over him. The District Court of Appeal reversed, stating
that the employer has a duty to provide a safe place to work. Whether
such duty is violated depends on whether a reasonable man would have
taken the steps omitted in the case at hand, in order to remove the danger.
The court stated that "F.E.L.A. liability attaches if defendant knew, or
... should have known that prevailing standards of conduct were inade-
quate to protect its employees." "' Important here is the court's judicial
recognition that there are a great number of automobile collisions and
that this is within the common knowledge of the public. It follows that
this common knowledge is to be considered by the court or jury in arriv-
ing at the standard of conduct to which the defendant is to be held. With
such knowledge, the defendant railroad in Mortensen was found to have
been negligent in not installing seat belts in its trucks in order to protect
its employees from the danger of ejection upon impact in a collision-a
fact which is clearly within the range of foreseeability.
Although the Mortensen case involved liability under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, it is submitted that any employer might be
found negligent upon the same factual basis under common law prin-
ciples, and might therefore be liable to an employee who proves a proxi-
mate causal relationship between his injuries (or at least some of them)
and the employer's negligent failure to install seat belts. 2 Further, such
reasoning might be applied to other cases involving injuries incurred in
vehicles belonging to another person,5" such as buses and taxis.
An argument based on Mortensen might be advanced by the defend-
ant in a personal injury suit arising out of an automobile collision that
the plaintiff, in failing to install seat belts was contributorily negligent.
In failing to take this self-protective care in the face of danger of which
plaintiff was, or should have been, aware, plaintiff failed to meet the
standard required of a reasonably prudent man under all circumstances.
50 245 A.C.A. 248, 53 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1966).
51 Id. at 251, 53 Cal.Rptr. at p. 854.52 The proximate cause problem is discussed in Part I of this comment concerning common
law contributory negligence for failure to utilize an available seat belt. In most states, em-
ployer-employee actions are initiated on the basis of workmen's compensation statutes, and
neither negligence of the employer nor contributory negligence of the employee are significant
53 Sams v. Sams, 48 S.E.2d 154 (N.C. 1966). Contra, Kavanaugh v. Butorac (Ind.App.Ct.,
Div. 1) 35 U.S.L. WEEK 2336 (Dec. 1966); Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So.2d 49 (Fla. 1966).
The guest statute must, however, be kept in mind. See CAL. VEH. CODE. §17158.
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Since the frequency of accidents is "common knowledge," a court may
find that a reasonable man would have seat belts in his car; and if plaintiff
did not have them, plaintiff might be found to have been negligent.
An interesting question arises as to the effect of a literal compliance
with the seat belt installation statute when the belts are installed, but are
defective. In Kapp v. Sullivan Chevrolet "' plaintiff brought an action
against the manufacturer, seller and installer of a seat belt which tore
during a collision. Her claim was that if the belt she used had not been
defective, she would not have been injured. The court held that defendant
had not been negligent since the force applied to the belt was greater than
that for which it was designed. In view of the California statutory require-
ments as to seat belt construction,5 such a holding would be questionable
in California. First, if the belts were in fact defective, and if plaintiff
were to show that his injuries resulted from the defect,56 it would seem
that the California strict liability tort rules should apply. Secondly, one
who violates a statute designed for public safety is negligent per se for all
proximately-caused injury.5
IV
EFFECT OF THE DEFENSE UPON PLAINTIFF'S RECOVERY
Assuming that defendant establishes that plaintiff's failure to use his seat
belt was contributory negligence and was the proximate cause of the
injury, the effect on the plaintiff's recovery must be decided.
In states having comparative negligence statutes the answer is simple
-plaintiff's contributory negligence is compared to defendant's negli-
gence and recovery is reduced by the amount of contributory negligence
apportioned to plaintiff.59 This was the result obtained in Stockinger v.
Dunisch,6 ° where the Wisconsin comparative negligence rule was utilized.
California is among those states having no comparative negligence
rule,6' so that contributory negligence is a complete bar to recovery. This
result is harsh and a jury is likely to be resentful when asked to bar the
injured plaintiff's recovery in toto for inadvertently not "buckling up"
54 234 Ark. 395, 353 S.W.2d 5 (1962). See also note, 38 So. CAL. L. REV. 733 (1965).
5 CAL. ADMIN. CODE Title 13, §§990-997.
56 This is the issue of proximate cause discussed in Part I under common law contributory
negligence in this comment.
57 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.2d 256, 37 Cal.Rptr. 896 (1964); Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d, 27 Cal.Rptr. 607 (1962).
58 Clinkscales v. Carver, 22 Cal.2d 72, 136 P.2d 777 (1943).
59 "Seat Belt Liability", Defense Memo, 7 For The Defense No. 2 (Feb. 1966).
60 (Cir. Ct. Sheboygan Cty., Wisc.) (1964) reported in 5 For The Defense 79 (Dec. 1964).
61 Sego v. Southern Pacific Co., 137 Cal. 405, 70 Pac. 279 (1902) ; Tucker v. United Rail-
roads, 171 Cal. 702, 154 Pac. 835 (1916).
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while the negligent defendant who caused the collision is allowed to go
unscathed.
To obviate this difficulty, a defendant could invoke a distinction be-
tween the negligent act of defendant which caused the impact and plain-
tiff's failure to "buckle up" which was a substantial contributing factor
in causing his injuries.'a The problem is the purely practical one of assign-
ing the injuries received to various causes, where possible. However, if no
division can be made, plaintiff's negligence should bar all recovery.'
Where injuries are capable of severance, damages should be appor-
tioned. A difficult problem is presented when the plaintiff's prior conduct
is found to have played no part in bringing about an impact, but to have
aggravated the ensuing damages." Dean Prosser suggests that in such a
case the better view is to apportion the damages if possible. If this is not
possible then any attempted division is pure speculation.65
The Texas case of Vernon v. Droeste" is an example of this approach
applied to seat belt cases. Texas has no comparative negligence rule and
in that state contributory negligence is a complete bar to an action based
on negligence. However, the case was decided on the basis of an appor-
tionment of damages. Plaintiff and-defendant were involved in a head-on
collision. Defendant was wearing his seat belt and was not injured seri-
ously. Plaintiff was not wearing a seat belt and suffered facial and leg
injuries sustained from forward motion into the dash and windshield. The
apportionment reasoning and approach are placed in perspective by the
court's instruction to the jury:
What percentage of plaintiff, Albert E. Vernon's, injuries would have
been avoided if he had been wearing the safety harness with which the
Volvo automobile was equipped at the time of the collision in question.67
The jury answered, "95 %". 8
Crucial to the apportionment issue is the proof necessary on the issue
of proximate cause, viz., that all the injuries would not have resulted, or
would have been substantially reduced, by the use of seat belts. Of
particular importance is expert testimony such as that employed in the
Vernon case. 9 In that case one of the safety experts for the defense testi-
fied that in his professional opinion the type of harness in the car would
have held plaintiff away from the windshield and that seat belts materially
6 "Seat Belt Liability", Defense Memo, 7 For The Defense No. 6 (June 1966) ; Note, 38
So. CAL. L. REv. 733 (1965).
63 PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §64 (3rd ed. 1964).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 (Dist.Ct. Brazos Cty., Texas) (1966) reported in 7 For The Defense No. 7 (Sept. 1966).6 7 Id.68 Id.
69 "Seat Belt Liability: Texas", 7 For The Defense No. 7 (Sept. 1966).
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lessened injuries in 95% of the cases where they were used. Under the
Mortensen case such evidence would seem to be admissible in California
on the issue of severing and apportioning the damages.
CONCLUSION
The drastic increase in motor vehicle accidents resulting in death in the
United States during the past five years7" has aroused public opinion in
favor of seat belt usage to help curb the slaughter. That the belts are
effective cannot be denied, but all too frequently the belts are left lying
on the seat when the moment of impact occurs.
It is reasonable to conclude, in view of the ever-growing social aware-
ness of seat belt effectiveness, that the courts might very well exact a
minimal self-protective act by the plaintiff before he drives: buckling a
seat belt. Recovery should be denied the plaintiff for those injuries caused
by the failure to use the belts.
Vernon v. Droeste,7' it is submitted, presents the most effective appli-
cation of the doctrine of contributory negligence to seat belt cases. In that
case, the injuries which plaintiff received due to the negligence of the de-
fendant, and those received due to his own failure to buckle the available
seat belt, were apportioned; recovery was denied for the latter injuries.
Apportionment was made despite the prevailing rule that contributory
negligence, no matter how slight, was to be considered a complete bar to
recovery. The same application could be utilized in California, resulting in
a more just determination of the liabilities of the parties, and, just as im-
portant, encouragement of seat belt usage, with resultant saving of thous-
ands of lives each year.
William Carnazzo
Paul G. Flynn
70 "In the ten years ending with 1961, motor vehicle deaths increased only 3 per cent,
and in the last five years of this period, deaths actually were down 4 per cent. In 1962,
though, deaths moved sharply above the 1961 total, and by 1965 were up 29 per cent. Urban
deaths were up 42 per cent during these four years, while rural deaths were up 23 per cent."
NATIONAL SAFETY COUTNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS (1966 ed.) at p. 45.
71 (Dist.Ct. Brazos Cty., Texas) (1966) reported in 7 For The Defense No. 7 (Sept. 1966).
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APPENDIX I
This appendix demonstrates the different types of "installation" seat belt legislation
pertinent to this comment.
Not"Equipped Standard
Statute "For Use" With" of Care*
CALIFORNIA VEH. CODE §27309 x
CONNECTICUT GEN. STAT. 14-100a x
FLORIDA STAT. ANN. 317.951 x
GEORGIA CODE ANN. 68-1801 x
ILLINOIS STAT. ANN. 95y2-217.1 x
INDIANA STAT. ANN. T47, §2241 x
IOWA CODE ANN. 321.445 x x
KANSAS STAT. ANN. 8-5, 135 x
MAINE REV. ANN. STAT. T29, §1368-A x x
MARYLAND ANN. CODE T66Y2, §296A x
MASSACHUSETTS ANN. LAWS 90:7 x
MICHIGAN STAT. ANN. 9.2410(2) x
MINNESOTA STAT. ANN. 169.685 x
MISSISSIPPI CODE ANN. 8254.5 x
MISSOURI STAT. ANN. 304.555 x
MONTANA REV. CODE 32.21.150.1 x
NEBRASKA REV. STAT. 39-7, 123.05 x
NEW JERSEY STAT. ANN. 39:3-76.2 x
NEW MEXICO STAT. 64-20-75 x
N. CAROLINA GEN. STAT. 20-135.2 x
N. DAKOTA CODE 39-21-41.1 x
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 4513.26.2 x
OKLAHOMA STAT. ANN. T47 §12-413 x
OREGON REV. STATS. 438.315 x
PENNSYLVANIA STATS. T75, §843 x
RHODE ISLAND GEN. LAWS 31-23-39 x
TENNESSEE CODE ANN. 59-930 x x
UTAH CODE ANN. 41-6-148.10 x
VIRGINIA CODE 46.1-309.1 x x
VERMONT STAT. ANN. T23, §4(29) x
WASHINGTON REV. CODE 46.37.510 x
W. VIRGINIA CODE 1721 (446a)(43) x
WISCONSIN STATS. 347.48 x
Totals: 18 15 4
*Statutes stating that their provisions are not to be used as a standard of care in a civil action.
